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The Java virtual machine and the .NET common language runtime feature an access control mecha-
nism specified operationally in terms of run-time stack inspection. We give a denotational semantics
in “eager” form, and show that it is equivalent to the “lazy” semantics using stack inspection. We
give a static analysis of safety, i.e., the absence of security errors, that is simpler than previous pro-
posals. We identify several program transformations that can be used to remove run-time checks.
We give complete, detailed proofs for safety of the analysis and for the transformations, exploiting
compositionality of the eager semantics.
1 Introduction
System security depends in part on protecting resources through specified access control policies. For
example, a policy may allow only some users the privilege to write the password file. A typical imple-
mentation of the policy found e.g., in UNIX operating systems, involves an access control list A which
associates with each user name n their set of privileges A (n). When a program is running it has an
associated user, normally the user who invoked the program. To write a file, a program for user n must
make a system call, and that system code checks whether A (n) includes the privilege of writing to the
file. In order for users to be able to change their passwords, the system code for this task executes in a
special mode (“setuid” in UNIX); the effective user is the owner of the code (say, root) rather than the
originator of the call (n , which can write some files but not the password file).
The Java and .NET platforms offer a similar but more general security system [12, 13]. Instead of
code being owned by a user or by “the system”, there can be code from a number of sources, called
principals, which can be offered varying degrees of trust. Moreover, instead of associating a principal
with a loadable executable file, principals can be associated with fragments such as class declarations.
Another refinement is that privileges must be explicitly enabled, by an operation called doPrivileged.
The intent is that a program only enables its privileges when they are needed; this “principle of least
privilege” [12] may help isolate the effect of security bugs and may facilitate static analysis. Before
executing a dangerous operation, a check is made that the associated privilege has been enabled and is
authorized for the current principal. This check is specified in terms of an implementation called stack
inspection. Each stack frame is marked with the principal associated with the code for that frame, and the
frame also records the privileges that have been enabled. This is used by procedure checkPermission
which inspects the current stack.
The above description of the security system is an operational one. While the mechanism itself is
easy to understand, it may over-constrain implementations, and it is difficult to analyze. Analysis is of
interest, e.g., to determine whether a program can exhibit security exceptions when given its expected
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permissions. Implementations of procedure calls do not always push stack, e.g., owing to inlining or tail
call optimization. To understand the security properties achieved, and to optimize performance, we need
analyses that capture the security model more abstractly.
Our contribution is threefold: (i) We give a denotational semantics in “eager” form, and show that it
is equivalent to the “lazy” semantics using stack inspection. (ii) We give a static analysis of safety, i.e.,
the absence of security errors. (iii) We identify several program transformations including some that can
be used to remove run-time checks. We give detailed proofs for the analysis and for the transformations,
exploiting compositionality of the eager semantics and simplicity of program equivalence in denotational
semantics.
Related work. Skalka and Smith [17] give an operational semantics and use it to justify a static analysis
of safety specified by a type system. Their type system is complicated by the choice of using a constraint
system which is the basis for a type inference algorithm. We use a similar type system, but prefer
to separate the specification of an analysis from algorithms to perform the analysis. We also include
recursion in the language. Their semantics is easily seen to model the operational descriptions of stack
inspection, but it has the usual shortcomings of operational semantics; for example, proofs ultimately go
by induction on computations.
Wallach, Appel and Felten [19] model the mechanism with an operational semantics that manipulates
formulas in a logic of authentication [1]. They show that the particular logical deductions corresponding
to checkPermission can be decided efficiently, and propose an implementation called “security passing
style” in which the security state is calculated in advance. The only result proven is equivalence of the
two implementations. They do not include recursion or higher order functions, and the formal semantics
is not made explicit. Although the use of logic sheds some light on the security properties achieved by
the mechanism, the approach requires a considerable amount of theory that is not directly germane to
analyzing safety or justifying optimizations.
Security passing style can be seen as a presentation of the eager means of evaluating security checks
mentioned by Li Gong [12]. The eager semantics facilitates proofs, but JVM and CLR implementations
use lazy semantics which appears to have better performance [12, 19, 13].
Pottier et al. [15] formalize the eager semantics by a translation into a lambda calculus, λsec, with
operations on sets. Using an operational semantics for the calculus, a proof is sketched of equivalence
with stack semantics. Using a very general framework for typing, a static analysis is given and a safety
result is sketched. The language extends the language of Skalka and Smith [17] by adding permission
tests. The works [17] and [15] aim to replace dynamic checks by static ones, but do not consider program
transformations as such.
This paper originated as a technical report more than a decade ago [3]. At about the same time,
and independently, Fournet and Gordon [11] investigated an untyped variant of λsec. They develop an
equational theory that can be used to prove the correctness of code optimizations in the presence of stack
inspection. A prime motivation for their work was the folklore that well-known program optimizations
such as inlining and tail call elimination are invalidated by stack inpection. Their technical development
uses small-step operational semantics and contextual equivalence of programs. To prove an extensive
collection of program equivalences they develop a form of applicative bisimilarity. Additionally, they
prove the equivalence of the lazy and eager implementations of stack inspection. This equivalence is
also proved in Skalka’s Ph.D. dissertation [16, Theorem 4.1, Chapter 4], where lazy and eager are termed
“backward” and “forward” stack inspection respectively.
Where Fournet and Gordon point out how tail call elimination can be invalidated by stack inspection,
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Clements and Felleisen [10] consider program semantics at the level of an abstract machine, namely
the CESK machine. With this semantics they are able to show tail call optimization can be validated
in full generality, and with its expected space savings. This is explored further by Ager et al [2]. They
inter-derive a reduction semantics for the untyped variant of the λsec-calculus, an abstract machine, and
a natural semantics, both without and with tail-call optimization. By unzipping the context in the ab-
stract machine, they connect these semantics to Wallach et al.’s security passing style, characterize stack
inspection as a computational monad, and combine this monad with the monad of exceptions.1
We treat a simply typed language similar to λsec, but with recursion. In contrast to the cited works we
use a denotational semantics, which is straightforward; in fact, once the meanings of types are specified,
the rest of the specification (i.e., meanings of expressions) follows easily.2 The simplicity of our model
makes it possible to give a self-contained formal semantics and succinct but complete formal proofs. For
example, denotational equality is a congruence simply because the semantics is compositional. We have
not formally connected the semantics with an operational one. Adequacy seems obvious. Full abstraction
is not obvious, but we have proved many of the contextual equivalences of Fournet and Gordon [11] and
expect the remainder to be straightforward to show.
In addition to considering program transformations, Fournet and Gordon [11] address the question of
what security properties can be enforced by stack inspection. They consider a variation that tracks history
in the sense of what code has influenced the result of a computation. Pistoia et al [14] propose a variation
that tracks implicit influences as well. The authors [5] propose another combination of information
flow tracking with stack inspection, using a type and effect system where security types for functions
are dependent on available permissions. In the interim, other code-based access mechanisms have been
introduced (e.g., static permissions in the Android platform) and there have been further development of
static analyses for security properties based on linear temporal logic [7, 6, 8, 18], but there seems to be
little additional work on program equivalence in the presence of stack inspection.
Outline. The next section explains stack inspection informally, and it introduces our language. Sec-
tion 3 gives the eager denotational semantics. Section 4 gives the static analysis for safety, including
examples and correctness proof. Section 5 proves a number of representative program transformations.
Section 6 shows how all checks can be removed from safe programs. Section 7 gives the stack-based
denotational semantics and shows that it is equivalent to the eager semantics. Section 8 concludes.
2 Overview and language
Each declared procedure is associated with a principal n . We call n the signer, and write signs n e for a
signed expression, because typically n is given by a cryptographic signature on a downloaded class file.
During execution, each stack frame is labeled with the principal that signs the function, as well as the set
P of privileges that have been explicitly enabled during execution of the function. For our purposes, a
frame is a pair 〈n,P〉, and a nonempty stack is a list 〈n,P〉 :: S with 〈n,P〉 the top. There should be an
initial stack S0 = 〈n0,∅〉 :: nil for some designated n0. An expression is evaluated in a stack S and with
an environment h that provides values for its free variables.
Java provides operations to enable and disable a privilege, i.e., to add it to the stack frame or remove
it. Normally these are used in bracketed fashion, as provided by procedure doPrivileged which is
given a privilege p and an expression e to evaluate. It enables p, evaluates e , and then disables p. Our
1Thanks to Olivier Danvy for communicating this explanation.
2Adding state is straightforward [4], but here we follow the cited works and confine attention to applicative expressions.
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construct is written dopriv p in e . The effect of dopriv p in e in stack 〈n,P〉 :: S is to evaluate e in
stack 〈n,P ∪{p}〉 :: S , that is, to assert p in the current frame. This is done regardless of whether p is
authorized for n .
Java’s checkPermission operation checks whether a certain privilege has been enabled and is au-
thorized for the current principal. Checking is done by inspecting the current stack. Each dangerous
code fragment should be guarded by a check for an associated privilege, so that the code cannot be exe-
cuted unless the check has succeeded. (This can be assured by inspection of the code, or by other forms
of analysis [9] but is beyond the scope of our paper.) In our syntax, a guarded expression is written
check p for e . The execution of an expression checked for privilege p is to raise a security error, which
we denote by ⋆, unless the following predicate is true of p and the current stack.
chk(p,nil) ⇔ false
chk(p,(〈n,P〉 :: S )) ⇔ p ∈A (n)∧ (p ∈ P ∨ chk(p,S ))
That is, a privilege is enabled for a stack provided there is some frame 〈n,P〉 with p ∈ P and p is
authorized for n and is authorized for all principals in frames below this one.
A direct implementation in these terms requires inspecting some or all of the stack frames. The
implementation is lazy in that no checking is performed when a privilege is enabled, only when it is
needed to actually perform a guarded operation. On the other hand, each check incurs a significant cost,
and in secure code the checks will never fail. Static analysis can detect unnecessary checks, and justify
security-preserving transformations.
A stack S determines a set privs S of enabled, authorized privileges, to wit:
p ∈ privs S ⇔ chk(p,S )
This gives rise to a simple form of eager semantics: instead of evaluating an expression in the context
of a stack S , we use privs S , along with the current principal which appears on top of S . The eager,
stack-free semantics is given in Section 3 and we will use this semantics exclusively in the static analysis
and program transformations that follow in Sections 4 and 5.
A denotational semantics that uses explicit stacks will be deferred until Fig. 4 of Section 7. As
mentioned previously, we will then take up the equivalence of the two semantics.
The language constructs are strict in ⋆: if a subexpression raises a security error, so does the entire
expression. In Java, security errors are exceptions that can be caught. Thus it is possible for a program
to determine whether a checkPermission operation will succeed. Rather than model the full exception
mechanism, we include a construct test p then e1 else e2 which evaluates e1 if chk(p,S ) succeeds in
the current stack S , and evaluates e2 otherwise. Note that security error ⋆ is raised only by the check
construct, not by test or dopriv.
In Java, the call of a procedure of a class signed by, or otherwise associated with, n , results in a
new stack frame for the method, marked as owned by n . We model methods as function abstractions,
but whereas Skalka and Smith use signed abstractions, we include a separate construct signs n e .3
Evaluation of signs n e in stack S goes by evaluating e in stack (〈n,∅〉 :: S ). For example, given a
stack S , the evaluation of the application
(fun x . signs user writepass(x ))“myName”
3Fournet and Gordon [11] also use a freely applicable construct for signing. Moreover they identify principals with sets of
permissions: their “framed” expression R[e] is like our signs n e for n with A (n) =R.
288 A Simple Semantics and Static Analysis for Stack Inspection
amounts to evaluating writepass(“myName”) in the stack (〈user ,∅〉 :: S ).
We separate signs from abstractions because it helps disentangle definitions and proofs, e.g., these
constructs are treated independently in our safety result. On the other hand, unsigned abstractions do
not model the Java mechanism. In our consistency result, Theorem 7.2, we show that our semantics
is equivalent to stack inspection for all standard expressions, i.e., those in which the body of every
abstraction is signed.
2.1 Syntax and typing
Given are sets Principals and Privileges, and a fixed access control list A that maps Principals to sets of
privileges. In the grammar for data types and expressions, n ranges over Principals and p over Privileges.
Application associates to the left. We include recursive definitions for expressiveness, and simple ab-
stractions fun x . e which, while expressible using letrec, are easier to understand in definitions and
proofs. For simplicity, the only primitive type is bool, and the only type constructor is for functions.
Products, sums, and other primitive types can be added without difficulty. Throughout the paper we use
true to exemplify the treatment of constants in general.
t ::= bool | (t → t)
e ::= true | x | if e then e1 else e2 |
fun x . e | e1 e2 | letrec f (x ) = e1 in e2 |
signs n e | dopriv p in e | check p for e | test p then e1 else e2
A signed abstraction nλx .e in the language of Skalka and Smith is written fun x . signs n e in
ours. Our safety result can be proved without restriction to expressions of this form. But for the eager
semantics to be equivalent to stack semantics, it is crucial that function bodies be signed so the semantics
correctly tracks principals on behalf of which the body of an abstraction is evaluated.
Definition 2.1 (Standard expression) An expression is standard if for every subexpression fun x . e or
letrec f (x ) = e in e1 we have that e is signs n e ′ for some n,e ′.
Well-formed expressions are characterized by typing judgements D ⊢ e : t which express that e has
type t where free identifiers are declared by D . A typing context D is a labeled tuple of declarations
{x1 : t1, . . . ,xk : tk}. We write D ,x : t for the extended context {x1 : t1, . . . ,xk : tk ,x : t}, and D .xi for
the type of xi . The typing rules are given in Figure 1.
2.2 The password example
As an example of the intended usage, we consider the problem of protecting the password file, using
a privilege p for changing password and w for writing to the password file. The user is authorized to
change passwords: A (user) = {p}. Root is authorized to change passwords and to write the password
file: A (root) = {p,w}. Suppose hwWrite is the operating system call which needs to be protected from
direct user access. The system provides the following code, which guards hwWrite with the privilege
w .
writepass = fun x . signs root check w for hwWrite(x ,“/etc/password”)
passwd = fun x . signs root check p for dopriv w in writepass(x )
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D ⊢ true : bool
D ,x : t ⊢ x : t
D ⊢ e : bool D ⊢ e1 : t D ⊢ e2 : t
D ⊢ if e then e1 else e2 : t
D ,x : t1 ⊢ e : t2
D ⊢ fun x . e : t1 → t2
D ⊢ e1 : t1 → t2 D ⊢ e2 : t1
D ⊢ e1 e2 : t2
D , f : t1 → t2,x : t1 ⊢ e1 : t2 D , f : t1 → t2 ⊢ e2 : t
D ⊢ letrec f (x ) = e1 in e2 : t
D ⊢ e : t
D ⊢ signs n e : t
D ⊢ e : t
D ⊢ dopriv p in e : t
D ⊢ e : t
D ⊢ check p for e : t
D ⊢ e1 : t D ⊢ e2 : t
D ⊢ test p then e1 else e2 : t
Figure 1: Typing rules.
Consider the following user programs.
bad1 = signs user writepass(“mypass”)
bad2 = signs user dopriv w in writepass(“mypass”)
use = signs user dopriv p in passwd(“mypass”)
Here bad1 raises a security exception because writepass checks for privilege w which is not possessed
by user . The user can try to enable w , as in bad2, but because w is not authorized for user the exception
is still raised. By contrast, use does not raise an exception: function passwd checks for privilege p
which is possessed by user , and it enables the privilege w needed by writepass . Using transformations
discussed in Section 5, checks that never fail can be eliminated. For example, the analysis will show that
use is safe, and the transformations will reduce use to
signs user signs root hwWrite(“mypass”,“/etc/password”)
3 Denotational semantics
This section gives the eager denotational semantics.
3.1 Meanings of types and type contexts
A cpo is a partially ordered set with least upper bounds of ascending chains; it need not have a least
element. Below we define, for each type t , a cpo [[t ]]. We assume that ⊥ and ⋆ are two values not in
{true, false} and not functions; this will ensure that {⊥,⋆}∩ [[t ]] = ∅ for all t . We will identify ⊥ with
non-termination and ⋆ with security errors. For cpo C , define C⊥⋆ = C ∪{⊥,⋆}, ordered as the disjoint
union of C with {⋆}, lifted with ⊥. That is, for any u,v ∈ C⊥⋆, define u ≤ v iff u =⊥, u = v , or u and
v are in C and u ≤ v in C .
We define [[bool]] = {true, false}, ordered by equality. We also take the powerset P(Privileges) to
be a cpo ordered by equality. Define
[[t1 → t2]] = P(Privileges)→ [[t1]]→ [[t2]]⊥⋆
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where → associates to the right and denotes continuous function space, ordered pointwise. Note that
lubs are given pointwise. Also, [[t1 → t2]] does not contain ⊥ but it does have a least element, namely the
constant function λP . λd .⊥.
Principals behave in a lexically scoped way. By contrast, privileges are dynamic and vary during
execution; this is reflected in the semantics of the function type.
Let D = {x1 : t1, . . . ,xk : tk} be a type context. Then [[D ]] is defined to be the set {x1 : [[t1]], . . . ,xk :
[[tk ]]} of labeled tuples of appropriate type. If h is such a record, we write h.xi for the value of field xi .
If D is the empty type context ∅, then the only element of [[D ]] is the empty record {}. For h ∈ [[D ]] and
d ∈ [[t ]] we write [h | x 7→d ] for the extended record in [[D ,x : t ]].
3.2 Meanings of expressions
An expression judgement denotes a function
[[D ⊢ e : t ]] ∈ Principals→P(Privileges)→ [[D ]]→ [[t ]]⊥⋆
Given a principal n , a set P ∈ P(Privileges) denoting privileges required by e , and environment h ∈
[[D ]], the meaning of [[D ⊢ e : t ]]nPh is either ⊥ or ⋆ or an element of [[t ]].
In contrast with the work of Fournet and Gordon we do not restrict P to be a subset of A (n), though
it can easily be done —simply by giving the denotation this dependent type:
[[D ⊢ e : t ]] ∈ (n : Principals)→P(A (n))→ [[D ]]→ [[t ]]⊥⋆ (1)
In programs of interest, signed at the top level, most expressions will in fact be applied to permission
sets that satisfy the restriction. Later we observe that the restriction is need for validity of some transfor-
mations, but surprisingly few of them.
In the denotational semantics (Figure 2), we use the metalanguage construct, let d = E1 in E2, with
the following semantics: if the value of E1 is either ⊥ or ⋆ then that is the value of the entire let expres-
sion; otherwise, its value is the value of E2 with d bound to the value of E1. The semantics of if-then-else
is ⋆-strict in the guard. We also write P ⊔n {p} for if p ∈A (n) then P ∪{p} else P .
The semantics is standard for the most part. We will only explain the meanings of the expressions
that directly concern security. In what follows, we will assume, unless otherwise stated, that expression
e is signed by principal n and is computed with privilege set P and in environment h.
The meaning of signsn ′ e is the meaning of e , signed by n ′, computed with privilege set P ∩A (n ′),
in h. To illustrate the idea, consider Li Gong’s example [12, Section 3.11.2]. A game applet, applet,
has a method that calls FileInputStream to open the file containing the ten current high scores. In our
semantics, this scenario entails finding the meaning of signs system FileInputStream, as invoked under
some privilege set P ⊆A (applet); and, this means we need to find the meaning of FileInputStream (i.e.,
whether read privileges are enabled) under the privilege set P ∩A (system). Assuming system has all
privileges, this reduces to checking if applet has been granted permission to read. If it has not been
granted the permission, the file will not be read, even though it calls system code to do so.
The meaning of dopriv p in e is the meaning of e computed with privilege set P ∪{p} if p ∈A (n),
and is the meaning of e computed with privilege set P if p 6∈A (n). The meaning of check p for e is a
security error if p 6∈P ; otherwise, the meaning is that of e . Finally, the meaning of test p then e1 else e2
is the meaning of e1 or e2 according as p ∈ P or p 6∈ P .
We leave it to the reader to check that the semantics of each construct is a continuous function of the
semantics of its constituent expressions, so the semantics of recursion is well defined.
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[[D ⊢ true : bool]]nPh = true
[[D ,x : t ⊢ x : t ]]nPh = h.x
[[D ⊢ if e then e1 else e2 : t ]]nPh = let b = [[D ⊢ e : bool]]nPh in
if b then [[D ⊢ e1 : t ]]nPh else [[D ⊢ e2 : t ]]nPh
[[D ⊢ fun x . e : t1 → t2]]nPh = λP ′ ∈P(Privileges). λd ∈ [[t1]].
[[D ,x : t1 ⊢ e : t2]]nP
′[h | x 7→d ]
[[D ⊢ e1 e2 : t2]]nPh = let f = [[D ⊢ e1 : t1 → t2]]nPh in
let d = [[D ⊢ e2 : t1]]nPh in fPd
[[D ⊢ letrec f (x ) = e1 in e2 : t ]]nPh
= let G(g) = λP ′. λd . [[D , f : t1 → t2,x : t1 ⊢ e1 : t2]]nP ′[h | f 7→g ,x 7→d ] in
[[D , f : t1 → t2 ⊢ e2 : t ]]nP [h | f 7→fix G ]
[[D ⊢ signs n ′ e : t ]]nPh = [[D ⊢ e : t ]]n ′(P ∩A (n ′))h
[[D ⊢ dopriv p in e : t ]]nPh = [[D ⊢ e : t ]]n(P ⊔n {p})h
[[D ⊢ check p for e : t ]]nPh = if p ∈ P then [[D ⊢ e : t ]]nPh else ⋆
[[D ⊢ test p then e1 else e2 : t ]]nPh = if p ∈ P then [[D ⊢ e1 : t ]]nPh else [[D ⊢ e2 : t ]]nPh
Figure 2: Denotational semantics
4 Static Analysis
The denotational semantics in Section 3 gives a dynamic or run-time view of safety; if a program is safe,
its execution will not yield ⋆. In this section, we specify a type system that statically guarantees safety;
if a program is well-typed in the system then it is safe. One may utilize the static analysis for optimizing
programs e.g., removing redundant checks of privileges at run-time.
The static analysis is specified by an extended form of typing judgement. The idea is to give not
only the type of an expression, but a principal n and set P of privileges for which the expression is safe.
An arrow type t1 → t2 denotes functions dependent on a set of privileges, and the static analysis uses
annotated types to track sets of privileges adequate for safety. We adopt a Greek notational style for types
in the static analysis. Letting Π range over sets of privileges, annotated types, θ , are defined by
θ ::= bool | (θ1
Π
−→ θ2)
For this syntax to be finitary, one could restrict Π to finite sets, but we have no need for such restriction in
our proofs. An expression typed θ1 Π−→ θ2 signifies that its application may require at least the privileges
Π for safe execution.
4.1 Type-based analysis
The analysis is specified by the typing judgement ∆; n ⊢ e : θ , Π. In words, expression e signed by
principal n and typed in context ∆, has (annotated) type θ and is safe provided at least the set Π of
privileges are enabled. Figure 3 gives the specification.
Constant true, identifiers, and anonymous functions of the form fun x . e are all safe: they do not
require any privileges be enabled for safe execution. However, the body e in fun x . e , may require a set
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∆; n ⊢ true : bool, ∅
∆,x : θ ; n ⊢ x : θ , ∅
∆,x : θ1; n ⊢ e : θ2, Π
∆; n ⊢ fun x . e : θ1 Π−→ θ2, ∅
∆; n ⊢ e1 : θ1 Π−→ θ2, Π1 ∆; n ⊢ e2 : θ ′1, Π2 θ ′1 ≤ θ1
∆; n ⊢ e1 e2 : θ2, Π∪Π1∪Π2
∆; n ⊢ e : bool, Π1 ∆; n ⊢ e1 : θ , Π2 ∆; n ⊢ e2 : θ , Π3
∆; n ⊢ if e then e1 else e2 : θ , Π1∪Π2∪Π3
∆, f : θ1
Π
−→ θ2,x : θ1; n ⊢ e1 : θ2, Π ∆, f : θ1
Π
−→ θ2; n ⊢ e2 : θ , Π1
∆; n ⊢ letrec f (x ) = e1 in e2 : θ , Π∪Π1
∆; n ⊢ e : θ , Π
∆; n ⊢ check p for e : θ , Π∪{p}
∆; n ⊢ e : θ , (Π⊔n {p})
∆; n ⊢ dopriv p in e : θ , Π
∆; n ′ ⊢ e : θ , Π Π⊆A (n ′)
∆; n ⊢ signs n ′ e : θ , Π
∆; n ⊢ e1 : θ , Π1 ∆; n ⊢ e2 : θ , Π2
∆; n ⊢ test p then e1 else e2 : θ , Π1∪Π2
Figure 3: Static analysis
of privileges Π be enabled. This is manifest in the type θ1 Π−→ θ2. The latent privileges, Π, get exposed
during an application, e1e2. Say e1 has type θ1
Π
−→ θ2; if Π1 may be enabled during e1’s execution,
and Π2 may be enabled during e2’s execution, then application itself may require Π be enabled; hence
Π∪Π1∪Π2 may be enabled during the execution of e1e2. The application rule also uses subtyping, as
discussed in the sequel.
The analysis for check p for e requires that in addition to privileges enabled for e , the privilege p
be enabled so that the check is safe. If Π is the set of privileges that may be enabled during the execution
of dopriv p in e , then p can be assumed to be enabled during the execution of e , provided p ∈A (n).
Finally, for signs n ′ e the only privileges that should be enabled are the ones authorized for n ′. Note
that a signed expression can occur in a term with a different owner, so it is not the case that Π ⊆A (n)
for every derivable ∆;n ⊢ e : θ , Π.
4.2 Subtyping
Where Skalka and Smith [17] use a constraint-based type system whose constraints subsequently must
be solved,4 our analysis is syntax-directed. In some sense, our system gives minimal types and privilege
assumptions. (Pottier et al.’s system [15] enjoys a principal types property also. Reasoning about mini-
mal security contexts for code invocation is also considered in several papers by Besson et al. [7, 6, 8].)
We do not formalize this notion, but informally it sheds light on the specification of the analysis. In the
case of values, such as variables and abstraction, the privilege set is empty. In the case of check p for e ,
the rule adds the checked privilege p to the “minimal” privileges of e , and similarly for the other security
constructs. In the case of conditional, a union is formed from the “minimal” privileges of the constituent
expressions, and the types of the constituents are the same as the type of the conditional. By contrast, in
the case of application e1e2, the “minimal” types and privileges for e1 and e2 need not match exactly. So
we define a relation of subtyping with the informal meaning that θ ′ ≤ θ provided the privileges required
4Pottier et al. [15] use unification of row variables, in a relatively complicated system.
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by θ ′ are contained in those required by θ . This is significant only in case e2 has functional type, in
which case the latent privileges of e2 should be among those of e1.
Subtyping is defined as the least relation ≤ with bool ≤ bool and, for arrow types, θ1
Π1−→ θ ′1 ≤
θ2
Π2−→ θ ′2 provided θ2 ≤ θ1, θ ′1 ≤ θ ′2, and Π1 ⊆Π2.
To relate the semantics to the static analysis, we need the ordinary type θ∗ obtained by erasing
annotations. This is defined by induction on θ , to wit: bool∗ = bool and (θ1
Π
−→ θ2)∗ = θ∗1 → θ∗2 . It is
easy to show that if θ1 ≤ θ2, then θ∗1 = θ∗2 .
Due to subtyping, an expression can have more than one annotated type and satisfy more than one
judgement. But a derivable judgement ∆; n ⊢ e : θ , Π has only one derivation, which is dictated by the
structure of e . Proofs in the sequel will go by “induction on e”, meaning induction on the derivation of
some judgement ∆; n ⊢ e : θ , Π.
4.3 Examples
For any n , the expressions in the password example (Section 2.2) can be analyzed as follows.
∅; n ⊢ writepass : string
{w}
−→ void , ∅
∅; n ⊢ passwd : string
{p}
−→ void , ∅
∅; n ⊢ use : void , ∅
This confirms that use is safe. On the other hand, there is no Π such that ∅; n ⊢ bad1 : void , Π or
∅; n ⊢ bad2 : void , Π. Such Π must satisfy w ∈ Π for the application of writepass , owing to the rules
for application and for dopriv in . And Π must satisfy A (user)⊆Π by the rule for signs.
Here is another example, inspired by ones in Skalka and Smith [17]. Define the following standard
expressions:
lp = fun f . signs n (fun x . signs n (dopriv p in (f x )))
cp = fun x . signs n (check p for x )
The reader can verify that one analysis for cp is given by the typing ∆; n ⊢ cp : (bool {p}−→ bool),∅ and
that the typing demands p ∈ A (n). Similarly, the reader can verify that one possible analysis for lp is
given by the typing ∆; n ⊢ lp : (bool {p}−→ bool) ∅−→ (bool ∅−→ bool),∅.
For all P ∈P(Privileges), for all h : ∆∗, we can show (omitting types and some steps),
[[lp]]nPh = λP1. λd1. λP2. λd2. [[dopriv p in f x ]]n(P2∩A (n))[h | f 7→ d1,x 7→ d2]
= {letting P3 = P2∩A (n)}
λP1. λd1. λP2. λd2. d1(P3⊔n {p})d2
[[cp]]nPh = λP ′1. λd ′1. if p ∈ (P ′1∩A (n)) then [[x ]]n(P ′1∩A (n))[h | x 7→d ′1] else ⋆
= λP ′1. λd ′1. if p ∈ (P ′1∩A (n)) then d ′1 else ⋆
Let F = [[lp]]nPh, let d = [[cp]]nPh, and let G = [[(lp cp)]]nPh. Then
[[(lp cp)]]nPh = FPd
= λP2. λd2. if p ∈ ((P3⊔n {p})∩A (n)) then d2 else ⋆
= λP2. λd2. d2 because p ∈A (n)
[[(lp cp)true]]nPh = GP([[true]]nPh)
= true
Hence (lp cp)true is safe in any environment and typable as ∆; n ⊢ (lp cp)true : bool,∅.
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4.4 Safety of the analysis
Theorem 4.1 (Safety) Suppose ∅; n ⊢ e : θ , Π is derivable. Then for all P ∈ P(Privileges) with
Π⊆ P , it is the case that [[∅ ⊢ e : θ∗]]nP{} 6= ⋆.
Proof: Immediate consequence of Lemma 4.5 below.
In order to serve as an adequate induction hypothesis, the lemma strengthens the theorem by allowing
judgements with non-empty contexts. But this is not enough. Values at arrow types are functions that
depend on privilege sets. As induction hypothesis for the case of application we require these functions
be safe with respect to the privilege set Π annotating their type.
Definition 4.2 For each annotated type θ the predicate safe θ on [[θ∗]]⊥⋆ is defined as follows:
safe θ(⊥) ⇔ true and safe θ(⋆) ⇔ false for all θ . For values other than ⊥ and ⋆, the definition is by
induction on structure of θ .
safe bool(b) ⇔ true
safe (θ1 Π−→ θ2)(f ) ⇔ ∀P ∈P(Privileges).∀d ∈ [[θ∗1 ]].
Π⊆ P ∧ safe θ1(d) ⇒ safe θ2(fPd)
The predicate safe ∆ on [[∆∗]] is defined by safe ∆(h)⇔ ∀x ∈ dom(h).safe(∆.x )(h.x ). Recall that h.x 6=
⊥ and h.x 6= ⋆, because ⊥ 6∈ [[t ]] and ⋆ 6∈ [[t ]], for all t .
Fact 4.3 θ ≤ θ ′ and safe θ d imply safe θ ′ d .
Proof: By induction on derivation of θ ≤ θ ′. The result is clear for bool ≤ bool. For (θ1 Π−→ θ2) ≤
(θ ′1
Π′
−→ θ ′2), assume safe (θ1
Π
−→ θ2) f . To show safe (θ ′1
Π′
−→ θ ′2) f , consider any P ∈P(Privileges),
such that Π′ ⊆ P , and any d ∈ [[θ ′1
∗]] with safe θ ′1 d . From the subtyping, we know that Π ⊆ Π′, hence
Π ⊆ P . Moreover, by induction on derivation of θ ′1 ≤ θ1, we obtain safe θ ′1 d implies safe θ1 d . Hence
from assumption safe (θ1 Π−→ θ2) f , we obtain safe θ2(fPd) holds. Now by induction on derivation
θ2 ≤ θ ′2, we obtain safe θ ′2(fPd).
Lemma 4.4 The predicate safe preserves lubs. That is, for any θ , let u : N→ [[θ∗]]⊥⋆ be an ascending
chain. Then, ∀i .safe θ (ui ) implies safe θ (
⊔
i ui).
Proof: By structural induction on θ . When θ = bool, the assumption safe θ (ui ) implies ui 6= ⋆ for
each i , so
⊔
i ui is true or false or ⊥. Thus the result holds by definition safe.
When θ = (θ1 Π−→ θ2), assume P ∈ P(Privileges) and d ∈ [[θ∗1 ]], such that Π ⊆ P and safe θ1(d).
Then, from assumption safe (θ1 Π−→ θ2) ui we obtain safe θ2 (uiPd) holds for every i . By the induction
hypothesis on θ2, we get safe θ2 (
⊔
i(uiPd)). Lubs are pointwise, so we get safe θ2 ((
⊔
i ui)Pd).
Lemma 4.5 Suppose ∆; n ⊢ e : θ , Π is derivable. Then for all P ∈P(Privileges), for all h ∈ [[∆∗]], if
safe ∆(h) and Π⊆ P then safe θ ([[∆∗ ⊢ e : θ∗]]nPh).
Theorem 4.1 follows from the lemma because safe ∅{} and safe θ([[∅ ⊢ e : θ∗]]nP{}) implies
[[∅ ⊢ e : θ∗]]nP{} 6= ⋆.
Another consequence of the lemma is that the language admits additional constants at all types,
declared in an initial context D0, provided the corresponding initial environment assigns a safe meaning
to each identifier in D0.
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Proof: of Lemma. Go by induction on the typing derivation, ∆; n ⊢ e : θ , Π. Throughout, we assume
P ∈P(Privileges) and h ∈ [[∆∗]] and safe ∆(h) and Π ⊆ P , and also let u = [[∆∗ ⊢ e : θ∗]]nPh for each
case of e .
• Case true: Then, u = true so safe bool(u) by definition safe.
• Case x : Then, u = h.x and safe θ(h.x ) follows, by definition safe, from the assumption safe ∆(h).
• Case if e then e1 else e2: Then Π1∪Π2∪Π3 ⊆ P , and
u = if b then [[∆∗ ⊢ e1 : θ∗]]nPh else [[∆∗ ⊢ e2 : θ∗]]nPh
where b = [[∆∗ ⊢ e : bool]]nPh. By the induction hypothesis on the typing derivation of e , noting
that Π1 ⊆P , we have safe bool(b) and hence b 6= ⋆. If b =⊥ then u =⊥ and⊥ is safe. Otherwise,
b = true or b = false. In the former case, by the induction hypothesis on the typing derivation of
e1, noting that Π2 ⊆ P , we have safe θ(u). The case of b = false is symmetric.
• Case fun x . e: Then u = λP ′. λd . [[∆∗,x : θ∗1 ⊢ e : θ∗2 ]]nP ′[h | x 7→ d ]. Thus u 6= ⋆. To prove
safe (θ1
Π
−→ θ2)(u), consider any P ′′ ∈ P(Privileges) and any d ′ ∈ [[θ∗1 ]] such that Π ⊆ P ′′
and safe θ1(d ′), to show safe θ2(uP ′′d ′). By semantics, uP ′′d ′ = [[∆∗,x : θ∗1 ⊢ e : θ∗2 ]]nP ′′[h |
x 7→ d ′], so the induction hypothesis for e yields safe θ2(uP ′′d ′) provided that Π ⊆ P ′′ and
safe (∆,x : θ1)[h | x 7→d ′]. We have Π⊆P ′′ by assumption, and safe (∆,x : θ1)[h | x 7→d ′] follows
from safe ∆(h) and safe θ1(d ′).
• Case e1 e2: Let f = [[∆∗ ⊢ e1 : θ∗1 → θ∗2 ]]nPh and d = [[∆∗ ⊢ e2 : θ ′1
∗]]nPh, so that u = fPd . (Recall
that θ ′1 ≤ θ1 implies θ ′1
∗ = θ∗1 so the application fPd makes sense.) From safety of h and the
assumption Π∪Π1 ∪Π2 ⊆ P , we get by induction on e1 that safe (θ1 Π−→ θ2)(f ), and we get
safe θ ′1(d) by induction on e2. By θ ′1 ≤ θ1 and Fact 4.3 we have safe θ ′1(d) ⇒ safe θ1(d). Then
by definition safe (θ1 Π−→ θ2)(f ) we get safe θ2(fPd).
• Case letrec f (x ) = e1 in e2: Then, Π∪Π1 ⊆ P .
Now u = [[∆∗, f : θ∗1 → θ∗2 ⊢ e2 : θ∗]]nP [h | f 7→fix G ], where
G(g) = λP ′. λd . [[∆∗, f : θ∗1 → θ∗2 ,x : θ∗1 ⊢ e1 : θ∗2 ]]nP ′[h | f 7→g ,x 7→d ]
To get safe θ(u) by induction for e2, we need Π1 ⊆ P and
safe (∆, f : θ1 Π−→ θ2)[h | f 7→fix G ]
The former follows from the assumption Π∪Π1⊆P . The latter follows from assumption, safe∆(h),
and safe (θ1 Π−→ θ2)(fix G). We proceed to show safety of fix G .
Now fixG =⊔i gi , where g0 = λP ′′. λd ∈ [[θ∗1 ]].⊥ and gi+1 =G(gi ). And, safe (θ1 Π−→ θ2)(fixG)
is a consequence of the following claim:
∀i . safe (θ1
Π
−→ θ2)(gi) (2)
Then from Lemma 4.4, we get safe (θ1 Π−→ θ2)(
⊔
i gi ). It remains to show (2), for which we
proceed by induction on i .
Base case: Show safe (θ1 Π−→ θ2)(g0). Assume any P ′′ ∈P(Privileges) and any v ∈ [[θ∗1 ]], such
that Π⊆ P ′′ and safe θ1(v). Then g0P ′′v =⊥ 6= ⋆ and safe θ2(g0P ′′v) holds.
296 A Simple Semantics and Static Analysis for Stack Inspection
Induction step: Assume safe (θ1 Π−→ θ2)(gi ), to show safe (θ1 Π−→ θ2)(gi+1).
Now gi+1 = G(gi ) = λP ′. λd . [[∆∗, f : θ∗1 → θ∗2 ,x : θ∗1 ⊢ e1 : θ∗2 ]]nP [h | f 7→gi ,x 7→d ]. Assume
any P ′′ ∈P(Privileges) and v ∈ [[θ∗1 ]], such that Π⊆ P ′′ and safe θ1(v). Then
gi+1P
′′(v) = [[∆∗, f : θ∗1 → θ∗2 ,x : θ∗1 ⊢ e1 : θ∗2 ]]nP ′′[h | f 7→gi ,x 7→v ]
Note that safe (∆, f : θ1 Π−→ θ2,x : θ1)[h | f 7→ gi ,x 7→ v ]. Therefore, by the main induction hy-
pothesis on the typing derivation ∆, f : θ1 Π−→ θ2,x : θ1; n ⊢ e1 : θ2, Π, since Π ⊆ P , we obtain
safe θ2(gi+1P ′′v).
• Case signs n ′ e: Then Π ⊆ P and u = [[∆∗ ⊢ e : θ∗]]n ′(P ∩A (n ′))h. The induction hypothesis
on the typing derivation of e can be used to obtain safe θ(u), because Π ⊆ (P ∩A (n ′)) which
follows from assumption Π⊆P and side condition Π⊆A (n ′) on the antecedent ∆; n ′ ⊢ e : θ , Π
of ∆; n ⊢ signs n ′ e : θ , Π.
• Case dopriv p in e: Then Π⊆ P and u = [[∆∗ ⊢ e : θ∗]]n(P ⊔n {p})h. By the induction hypoth-
esis for e , noting that (Π⊔n {p}) ⊆ (P ⊔n {p}), we have safe θ(u).
• Case check p for e:
Then Π∪{p} ⊆ P , hence p ∈ P . Now u = if p ∈ P then [[∆∗ ⊢ e : θ∗]]nPh else ⋆. Since p ∈ P ,
we have, u = [[∆∗ ⊢ e : θ∗]]nPh and, by the induction hypothesis on the typing derivation of e , we
have safe θ(u).
• Case test p then e1 else e2: Then Π1∪Π2 ⊆ P and
u = if p ∈ P then [[∆∗ ⊢ e1 : θ∗]]nPh else [[∆∗ ⊢ e2 : θ∗]]nPh
We have two cases. Suppose p ∈ P . Then, by induction hypothesis on typing derivation of e1 and
noting that Π1 ⊆ P , we have u = [[∆∗ ⊢ e1 : θ∗]]nPh and safe θ(u). The case where p 6∈ P , is
symmetric.
5 Some program transformations
Using the eager semantics it is straightforward to justify program transformations that can be used for
optimization. This section shows how checks can be eliminated from the password example and also
considers the proofs of some primitive equations from Fournet and Gordon’s work [11].
5.1 Transformations that eliminate checks
First, we list a series of program transformations that move checking of privileges “outwards”.
if e then check p for e1 else check p for e2 = check p for if e then e1 else e2
e1(check p for e2) = check p for e1e2
test p then e1 else check p for e2 = check p for test p then e1 else e2
test p ′ then check p for e1 else check p for e2 = check p for test p
′ then e1 else e2
letrec f (x ) = e1 in check p for e2 = check p for letrec f (x ) = e1 in e2
check p for check p for e = check p for e
These are unconditional equalities, as the reader can verify using the denotational semantics (Figure 2).
We emphasize that this means extensional equality of the functions denoted by the two sides. In par-
ticular, e = e ′ means [[D ⊢ e : t ]]nPh = [[D ⊢ e ′ : t ]]nPh for all n,P ,h. Corresponding to Fournet and
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Gordon one may consider a slightly weaker notion of equality where P ranges over subsets of A (n), as
indicated by (1) in Section 3.2. Later we encounter one transformation that only holds for that weaker
equality.
Once checks have been moved outward, some can be eliminated. To eliminate a check, it must
be known definitely to succeed, e.g., because it has been enabled for an authorized principal. We give
an example transformation of this kind in Theorem 5.4, formulated in terms of the following notions
concerning expressions that do not depend on privilege p.
Definition 5.1 (p-purity) An expression e is p-pure if e has no sub-expressions of the form
check p for e ′ or test p then e ′ else e ′′.
For each type t we define semantic p-purity as a predicate pure p t on [[t ]]⊥⋆, as follows:
pure p t(⊥)⇔ true and pure p t(⋆)⇔ true for all t . For values other than ⊥ and ⋆, the definition is by
induction on structure of t .
pure p bool(b) ⇔ true
pure p (t1 → t2)(f ) ⇔ ∀P ∈P(Privileges).∀d ∈ [[t1]].
pure p t1(d) ⇒ pure p t2(fPd)∧ fPd = f (P −{p})d
Finally, for environment h ∈ [[D ]] we define pure p D(h) iff pure p t(h.x ) for all x : t in D .
Lemma 5.2 Suppose u : N→ [[t1 → t2]] is an ascending chain. Then ∀i .pure p (t1 → t2)(ui ) implies
pure p (t1 → t2)(⊔iui ).
Proof: By definition of pure and since joins are given pointwise.
Lemma 5.3 If e is p-pure and typable as D ⊢ e : t , then for all n,P ,h with pure p D(h) we have
[[D ⊢ e : t ]]nPh = [[D ⊢ e : t ]]n(P −{p})h
and pure p t([[D ⊢ e : t ]]nPh).
Proof: By induction on e . We observe for any D ,n,P ,h with pure p D (h)
• Case true: The equation is direct from the semantics, which is independent of P . For p-purity of
true, the result holds by definition of pure p bool.
• Case x : the equation is direct from the semantics which is independent of P . For p-purity of
[[D ⊢ x : t ]]nPh, the result holds by hypothesis on h.
• Case if e1 then e2 else e3: straightforward use of induction.
• Case fun x . e: The equation holds because the semantics is independent of P . Purity holds by
induction on e .
• Case e1e2: To show the equation, we use that [[D ⊢ e1]] is p-pure, which holds by induction. To
show purity, we again use purity of e1 as well as purity of e2.
• Case letrec f (x ) = e1 in e2: By induction on e2, using Lemma 5.2.
• Case signs n ′ e: The equation is direct from semantics, using the fact that (P ∩A (n ′))−{p}=
(P −{p})∩A (n ′).
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• Case dopriv p ′ in e: We first consider the case where p ′ is distinct from p. We have
[[D ⊢ dopriv p ′ in e : t ]]nPh
= [[D ⊢ e : t ]]n(P ⊔n {p
′})h semantics
= [[D ⊢ e : t ]]n((P ⊔n {p
′})−{p})h induction hyp.
= [[D ⊢ e : t ]]n((P −{p}⊔n {p
′})h p,p ′distinct
= [[D ⊢ dopriv p ′ in e : t ]]n(P −{p})h semantics
In case p ′ is p we have
[[D ⊢ dopriv p in e : t ]]nPh
= [[D ⊢ e : t ]]n(P ⊔n {p})h semantics
= [[D ⊢ e : t ]]n((P −{p})⊔n {p})h see below
= [[D ⊢ dopriv p in e : t ]]n(P −{p})h semantics
The middle step is by cases on whether p ∈A (n). If it is, the step holds by simply by definition
of ⊔n . If not, the step holds by induction on e .
• Case check p ′ for e: Here p ′ is distinct from p, by p-purity. We observe
[[D ⊢ check p ′ for e : t ]]nPh
= if p ′ ∈ P then [[D ⊢ e : t ]]nPh else ⋆ semantics
= if p ′ ∈ P −{p} then [[D ⊢ e : t ]]n(P −{p})h else ⋆ p ′,p distinct, ind. for e
= [[D ⊢ check p ′ for e : t ]]n(P −{p})h
• Case test p ′ then e1 else e2: Again, p ′ is distinct from p, and the argument is similar to check.
Theorem 5.4 For all n , all p ∈A (n), and all p-pure closed terms e
signs n dopriv p in check p for e = signs n e
Proof: Let h be the empty environment, for e which is closed. We observe for any n ′,P :
[[signs n dopriv p in check p for e]]n ′Ph
= [[dopriv p in check p for e]]n(A (n)∩P)h semantics
= [[check p for e]]n((A (n)∩P)⊔n {p})h semantics
= [[check p for e]]n((A (n)∩P)∪{p})h def ⊔n , using p ∈A (n)
= [[e]]n((A (n)∩P)∪{p})h semantics
= [[e]]n(A (n)∩P)h e and h are p-pure, Lemma 5.3
= [[signs n e]]n ′Ph semantics
In the penultimate step, two uses are needed for the lemma: to remove p and, in the case that p ∈ P , to
add it back.
In order to deal with the password example we need the following conditional equivalence.
Theorem 5.5 For all n , all p ∈A (n), and all terms e
signs n check p for e = check p for signs n e
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Proof: We observe for any n ′,P ,h:
[[signs n check p for e]]n ′Ph
= [[check p for e]]n(P ∩A (n))h semantics
= if p ∈ (P ∩A (n)) then [[e]]n(P ∩A (n))h else ⋆ semantics
= if p ∈ P then [[e]]n(P ∩A (n))h else ⋆ sets, since p ∈A (n)
= if p ∈ P then [[signs n e]]n ′Ph else ⋆ semantics
= [[check p for signs n e]]n ′Ph semantics
The above proofs are examples of the benefit of a compositional semantics. The proofs are by direct
calculation, without need for induction. For Theorem 5.4, the proof goes through for open terms as well,
if the environment h is pure. One expects built-in constants to have pure and safe values.
5.2 The password example
We now revisit the password example, using Theorems 5.4 and 5.5 to eliminate checks. We abbreviate
user ,root as u,r .
passwd(“mypass”)
= {because passwd = (fun x . signs r check p for dopriv w in writepass(x ))}
signs r check p for dopriv w in writepass(“mypass”)
= {because writepass = (fun x . signs r check w for hwWrite(x ,“/etc/password”))}
signs r check p for dopriv w in signs r check w for hwWrite(“mypass”,“/etc/password”)
= {by Theorem 5.5 since A (r) = {p,w}}
check p for signs r dopriv w in check w for signs r hwWrite(“mypass”,“/etc/password”)
= {by Theorem 5.4 since w ∈A (r) and signs r hwWrite(. . .) is p-pure closed}
check p for signs r signs r hwWrite(“mypass”,“/etc/password”)
= {because signs n signs n e = signs n e}
check p for signs r hwWrite(“mypass”,“/etc/password”)
In the last step we used the unconditional equation signs n signs n e = signs n e which is easily
proved. Finally, we obtain:
use = signs u dopriv p in passwd(“mypass”)
= signs u dopriv p in check p for signs r hwWrite(“mypass”,“/etc/password”)
= {by Theorem 5.4 since p ∈A (u) and signs r hwWrite(. . .) is p-pure closed}
signs u signs r hwWrite(“mypass”,“/etc/password”)
5.3 Other transformations
We now give an example of a transformation which employs a weaker notion of equality than the ones
in Section 5.1, cf. (1). This is the TestGrant equation of Fournet and Gordon,5 which, in our notation
amounts to proving, for all n,P ,h,p,e1,e2, with P ⊆A (n),
[[test p then e1 else e2]]nPh = [[test p then dopriv p in e1 else e2]]nPh (3)
5Theirs is slightly more general, as their test and dopriv apply to permission sets; this can be desugared to singleton
permissions as in our notation.
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To show (3) we use the denotational semantics and prove
if p ∈ P then [[e1]]nPh else [[e2]]nPh = if p ∈ P then [[dopriv p in e1]]nPh else [[e2]]nPh
It suffices to prove that when p ∈ P , we have [[e1]]nPh = [[dopriv p in e1]]nPh. We calculate:
[[dopriv p in e1]]nPh
= [[e1]]n(P ⊔n {p})h semantics
= [[e1]]nPh because p ∈ P and P ⊆A (n) implies p ∈A (n)
We have proved the correctness of several other primitive equations in Fournet and Gordon’s pa-
per [11, Section 4.1].6 Specifically, Frame Frame, Frame Frame Frame, Frame Frame Grant, Frame
Grant, Frame Grant Frame, Frame Grant Test, Frame Test Then, Grant Grant, Grant Frame, Grant
Frame Grant and Test ∪. We have also proved the correctness of their derived equations Frame Appl,
Frame Frame Intersect and Frame Grant Intersect. Our proofs of these equations do not require the
restriction P ⊆A (n).
We have also proved the tail call elimination laws in [11, Section 5.2]. The basic idea in tail call
elimination is to not build a new frame for the last call of a function; instead the callee can directly
return to the caller’s caller. Tail call elimination is problematic with stack inspection, as a stack frame
holds the principal for the current code (or, equivalently, the principal’s static permissions). As noted
earlier, Clements and Felleisen [10] give an abstract machine for which tail call elimination is sound and
efficient. The calculus and small-step semantics of Fournet and Gordon [11, Section 5.2] allows a limited
modeling of tail call elimination. Here is one of their two transformations, in our notation:
signs n2 ((fun x . signs n1 e1) e2) = ((fun x . signs n1 e1) e2) (4)
From left to right this can be read as dropping the “frame” of the calling context. In their setting it can
be read as a transition, provided that e2 is a value. They show that this added transition is admissible, in
the sense of not changing outcomes, provided that the callee’s static permissions are among the caller’s,
i.e.A (n1) ⊆ A (n2). For our purposes, a value is a boolean literal, a variable (whose value is thus in
the environment) or an abstraction. We shall prove that the equation holds in our semantics, under these
conditions. For the proof, it is convenient to use the following easily proved fact which holds for any
D ,e1,e2,n,P ,h.
[[D ⊢ (fun x . e1) e2]]nPh = [[D ,x : t ⊢ e1]]nP [h | x 7→ [[D ⊢ e2]]nPh] (5)
Note: if e2 is a value then its semantics [[D ⊢ e2]]nPh is independent from P (though not necessarily
from n or h); see Fig. 2. To prove (4) we observe
[[D ⊢ signs n2 ((fun x . signs n1 e1) e2)]]nPh
= [[D ⊢ ((fun x . signs n1 e1) e2)]]n(P ∩A (n2))h by semantics of signs
= [[D ,x : t ⊢ signs n1 e1]]n(P ∩A (n2))[h | x 7→ [[D ⊢ e2]]n(P ∩A (n2))h] lemma (5)
= [[D ,x : t ⊢ e1]]n(P ∩A (n1))[h | x 7→ [[D ⊢ e2]]n(P ∩A (n2))h] sem., A (n1)⊆A (n2)
= [[D ,x : t ⊢ e1]]n(P ∩A (n1))[h | x 7→ [[D ⊢ e2]]nPh] e2 value, Note above
= [[D ,x : t ⊢ signs n1 e1]]nP [h | x 7→ [[D ⊢ e2]]nPh] semantics of signs
= [[D ⊢ ((fun x . signs n1 e1) e2)]]nPh lemma (5)
As with most of the other equations, the restriction P ⊆A (n) is not necessary here. Fournet and Gordon
give a second equation, also provable in our setting, that models tail calls involving dopriv.
6For a few we need to consider the evident generalization of our language that allows permission sets in dopriv (for Grant
Grant, Grant Frame, and Frame Grant Intersect) and in test (for Test ∪).
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6 Using the Static Analysis
Section 5 gives several program transformations that can be justified by the eager denotational semantics
of our language. A more drastic transformation is possible under some conditions. The safety results of
Section 4 show that if the static analysis derives a judgement ∆; n ⊢ e : θ ,Π, then executing e using a
privilege set that contains at least the enabled privileges Π would not lead to a security error. We should
therefore be able to drop all dopriv’s and check’s from e . If e is test-free, we can then show that the
meaning of e is the same as its meaning with dopriv’s and check’s erased. This is formalized below.
Definition 6.1 The erasure translation (.)− is defined as follows:
true− = true
x− = x
(if e1 then e2 else e3)
− = if e−1 then e
−
2 else e
−
3
(fun x . e)− = fun x . e−
(letrec f (x ) = e1 in e2)
− = letrec f (x ) = e−1 in e
−
2
(signs n e)− = signs n e−
(dopriv p in e)− = e−
(check p for e)− = e−
(test p then e1 else e2)
− is undefined.
Theorem 6.2 Let e be test-free and let ∅; n ⊢ e : bool,Π. Then for all P ∈P(Privileges), if Π⊆ P
then [[∅ ⊢ e : bool]]nP{}= [[∅ ⊢ e− : bool]]nP{}.
Proof: Immediate consequence of Lemma 6.6 and definition rel bool below.
Definition 6.3 For each annotated type θ the relation rel θ on [[θ∗]]⊥⋆ is defined as follows: For all θ ,
rel θ ⊥ ⊥ holds and otherwise rel θ d d ′ is false if either d or d ′ is in {⊥,⋆}. For values other than ⊥,⋆,
the definition is by induction on structure of θ .
rel bool b b ′ ⇔ b = b ′
rel (θ1
Π
−→ θ2) f f ′ ⇔ ∀P ∈P(Privileges).∀d ,d ′ ∈ [[θ∗1 ]].
Π⊆ P ∧ rel θ1 d d ′ ⇒ rel θ2 (fPd) (f ′Pd ′)
For annotated type environment ∆, the predicate rel ∆ on [[∆∗]] is defined by rel ∆ h h ′ ⇔ dom(h) =
dom(h ′) and ∀x ∈ dom(h).rel (∆.x ) (h.x ) (h ′.x ).
Fact 6.4 θ ≤ θ ′ and rel θ d d ′ imply rel θ ′ d d ′.
Proof: By induction on derivation of θ ≤ θ ′. The result is clear for bool ≤ bool. For (θ1 Π−→ θ2) ≤
(θ ′1
Π′
−→ θ ′2), assume rel (θ1
Π
−→ θ2) f f ′. To show rel (θ ′1
Π′
−→ θ ′2) f f ′, consider any P ∈P(Privileges),
such that Π′⊆P , and any d ,d ′ ∈ [[θ ′1
∗]] with rel θ ′1 d d ′. From the subtyping, we know that Π⊆Π′, hence
Π⊆P . Moreover, by induction on derivation of θ ′1 ≤ θ1, we obtain rel θ ′1 d d ′ implies rel θ1 d d ′. Hence
from assumption rel (θ1 Π−→ θ2) f f ′, we obtain rel θ2(fPd)(f ′Pd ′). Now by induction on derivation
θ2 ≤ θ ′2, we obtain rel θ ′2(fPd)(f ′Pd ′).
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Fact 6.5 The relation rel preserves lubs. That is, for any θ , let u,u ′ : N→ [[θ∗]]⊥⋆ be ascending chains.
Then, ∀i .rel θ ui u ′i implies rel θ (
⊔
i ui )(
⊔
i u
′
i
).
Proof: By structural induction on θ . When θ = bool, we have ⊔i ui =
⊔
i u
′
i
= true or false or ⊥. Thus
the result holds by definition rel.
When θ = (θ1
Π
−→ θ2), assume P ∈ P(Privileges) and d ,d ′ ∈ [[θ∗1 ]], such that Π ⊆ P and rel θ1d d ′.
Then, from assumption rel (θ1
Π
−→ θ2) ui u ′i we obtain rel θ2 (uiPd)(u ′iPd ′) for every i . Hence, by the
induction hypothesis on θ2, we get rel θ2 (
⊔
i(uiPd))(
⊔
i(u
′
i
Pd ′)). Because lubs are pointwise, we get
rel θ2 ((
⊔
i ui)Pd)((
⊔
i u
′
i
)Pd ′).
Lemma 6.6 Suppose ∆; n ⊢ e : θ , Π is derivable and e is test-free. Then for all P ∈P(Privileges),
for all h,h− ∈ [[∆∗]], if rel ∆ h h− and Π ⊆ P then rel θ u u−, where u = [[∆∗ ⊢ e : θ∗]]nPh and u− =
[[∆∗ ⊢ e− : θ∗]]nPh−.
(Note that h−,u− are just suggestively named identifiers whereas e− is the erasure of e .) Theorem
6.2 follows from the lemma because rel ∅ {} {} and by definition rel bool, [[∅ ⊢ e : bool]]nP{} =
[[∅ ⊢ e− : bool]]nP{}.
Proof: of Lemma. Go by induction on the typing derivation, ∆; n ⊢ e : θ , Π. Throughout, we as-
sume P ∈ P(Privileges) and h,h− ∈ [[∆∗]] and rel ∆ h h−. Let u = [[∆∗ ⊢ e : θ∗]]nPh and u− =
[[∆∗ ⊢ e− : θ∗]]nPh− for each case of e .
• Case true: Then, u = true= u− and rel bool u u− by definition rel.
• Case x : Then, u = h.x and u− = h−.x . And, rel θ u u− follows from assumption rel ∆ h h−.
• Case if e then e1 else e2: Then Π1∪Π2∪Π3 ⊆ P , and
u = if b then [[∆∗ ⊢ e1 : θ∗]]nPh else [[∆∗ ⊢ e2 : θ∗]]nPh
u− = if b− then [[∆∗ ⊢ e−1 : θ∗]]nPh− else [[∆∗ ⊢ e−2 : θ∗]]nPh−
where b = [[∆∗ ⊢ e : bool]]nPh and b− = [[∆∗ ⊢ e− : bool]]nPh−. By the induction hypothesis
on the typing derivation of e , noting that Π1 ⊆ P , we have rel bool b b−. If b = ⊥ = b− then
u =⊥= u− and rel θ ⊥ ⊥. Otherwise, b = true or b = false. In the former case, by the induction
hypothesis on the typing derivation of e1, noting that Π2 ⊆ P , we have rel θ u u−. In the latter
case, by the induction hypothesis on the typing derivation of e2, noting that Π3 ⊆ P , we have
rel θ u u−.
• Case fun x . e: Then u = λP ′. λd . [[∆∗,x : θ∗1 ⊢ e : θ∗2 ]]nP ′[h | x 7→d ]
u− = λP ′. λd−. [[∆∗,x : θ∗1 ⊢ e− : θ∗2 ]]nP ′[h− | x 7→d−]
To prove rel (θ1
Π
−→ θ2) u u−, consider any P ′ ∈ P(Privileges) and any d ,d− ∈ [[θ∗1 ]] such that
Π⊆ P ′ and rel θ1 d d−, to show rel θ2 (uP ′d ′) (u−P ′d−). By semantics,
uP ′d = [[∆∗,x : θ∗1 ⊢ e : θ∗2 ]]nP ′[h | x 7→d ]
u−P ′d− = [[∆∗,x : θ∗1 ⊢ e− : θ∗2 ]]nP ′[h− | x 7→d−]
So the induction hypothesis for e yields rel θ2 (uP ′d) (u−P ′d−) provided that Π ⊆ P ′ and
rel (∆,x : θ1)[h | x 7→ d ][h− | x 7→ d−]. We have Π ⊆ P ′ by assumption, and rel (∆,x : θ1)[h |
x 7→d ][h− | x 7→d−] follows from rel ∆ h h− and rel θ1 d d−.
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• Case e1 e2: Let f = [[∆∗ ⊢ e1 : (θ1 Π−→ θ2)∗]]nPh and d = [[∆∗ ⊢ e2 : θ ′1
∗]]nPh, so that u = fPd .
Let f − = [[∆∗ ⊢ e−1 : (θ1
Π
−→ θ2)∗]]nPh− and d− = [[∆∗ ⊢ e−2 : θ ′1
∗]]nPh−, so that u− = f −Pd−.
(Recall that θ ′1 ≤ θ1 implies θ ′1∗ = θ∗1 so the applications fPd and f −Pd− make sense.) From
rel ∆ h h− and assumption Π∪Π1∪Π2 ⊆ P , we get by induction on e1 that rel (θ1
Π
−→ θ2) f f −,
and we get rel θ ′1 d d− by induction on e2. By θ ′1 ≤ θ1 and Fact 6.4 we have rel θ ′1 d d− ⇒
rel θ1 d d−. Then by definition rel (θ1
Π
−→ θ2) f f −, since Π⊆ P , we get rel θ2(fPd)(f −Pd−).
• Case letrec f (x ) = e1 in e2: Then, Π∪Π1 ⊆ P .
Now u = [[∆∗, f : (θ1
Π
−→ θ )2∗ ⊢ e2 : θ∗]]nP [h | f 7→fix G ]
u− = [[∆∗, f : (θ1 Π−→ θ )2∗ ⊢ e−2 : θ∗]]nP [h− | f 7→fix G−]
where G(g) = λP ′. λd . [[∆∗, f : (θ1 Π−→ θ2)∗,x : θ∗1 ⊢ e1 : θ∗2 ]]nP ′[h | f 7→g ,x 7→d ]
G−(g−) = λP ′. λd−. [[∆∗, f : (θ1 Π−→ θ2)∗,x : θ∗1 ⊢ e−1 : θ∗2 ]]nP ′[h− | f 7→g−,x 7→d−]
To show rel θ u u− by induction on e2, we need Π1 ⊆ P and
rel (∆, f : θ1
Π
−→ θ2) [h | f 7→fix G ] [h− | f 7→fix G−]
The former follows from assumption Π∪Π1 ⊆P . The latter follows from assumption, rel ∆ h h−,
and rel (θ1
Π
−→ θ2)(fix G)(fix G−), which we now proceed to show.
Now fix G = ⊔i gi , where g0 = λP ′. λd ∈ [[θ∗1 ]]. ⊥ and gi+1 = G(gi). Also fix G− =
⊔
i g
−
i
,
where g−0 = λP ′. λd− ∈ θ∗1 . ⊥ and g−i+1 = G−(g−i ). And, rel (θ1
Π
−→ θ2)(fix G)(fix G−) is a
consequence of the following claim:
∀i . rel (θ1
Π
−→ θ2) gi g−i (6)
Then from Lemma 6.5, we get rel (θ1
Π
−→ θ2)(
⊔
i gi)(
⊔
i g
−
i
). It remains to show (6), for which
we proceed by induction on i .
Base case: Show rel (θ1 Π−→ θ2) g0 g−0 . Assume any P ′ ∈ P(Privileges) and any v ,v− ∈ [[θ∗1 ]],
such that Π⊆ P ′ and rel θ1 v v−. Then g0P ′v =⊥= g−0 P ′v− and rel θ2(g0P ′v)(g−0 P ′v−).
Induction step: Assume rel (θ1 Π−→ θ2) gi g−i , to show rel (θ1
Π
−→ θ2) gi+1 g−i+1.
Now gi+1 = λP ′. λd . [[∆∗, f : (θ1 Π−→ θ2)∗,x : θ∗1 ⊢ e1 : θ∗2 ]]nP [h | f 7→gi ,x 7→d ]
g−
i+1 = λP ′. λd−. [[∆∗, f : (θ1
Π
−→ θ2)∗,x : θ∗1 ⊢ e−1 : θ∗2 ]]nP [h− | f 7→g−i ,x 7→d−]
Assume any P ′ ∈P(Privileges) and v ,v− ∈ [[θ∗1 ]], such that Π⊆ P ′ and rel θ1 v v−. Then
gi+1P
′v = [[∆∗, f : (θ1 Π−→ θ2)∗,x : θ∗1 ⊢ e1 : θ∗2 ]]nP ′[h | f 7→gi ,x 7→v ]
g−
i+1P
′v− = [[∆∗, f : (θ1 Π−→ θ2)∗,x : θ∗1 ⊢ e1 : θ∗2 ]]nP ′[h− | f 7→g−i ,x 7→v−]
Note that rel (∆, f : θ1
Π
−→ θ2,x : θ1) [h | f 7→gi ,x 7→v ] [h− | f 7→g−i ,x 7→v−]. Therefore, by the
main induction hypothesis on the typing derivation ∆, f : θ1
Π
−→ θ2,x : θ1; n ⊢ e1 : θ2, Π, since
Π⊆ P , we obtain rel θ2(gi+1P ′v)(g−i+1P ′v−).
• Case signs n ′ e: Then Π ⊆ P and u = [[∆∗ ⊢ e : θ∗]]n ′(P ∩A (n ′))h. The induction hypothesis
on the typing derivation of e can be used to obtain rel θ u u−, because Π ⊆ (P ∩A (n ′)) which
follows from assumption Π⊆ P and side condition Π⊆A (n ′).
• Case dopriv p in e: Then Π⊆ P and u = [[∆∗ ⊢ e : θ∗]]n(P ⊔n {p})h. By the induction hypoth-
esis for e , noting that (Π⊔n {p}) ⊆ (P ⊔n {p}), we have rel θ u [[∆∗ ⊢ e− : θ∗]]n(P ⊔n {p})h−.
But now e− is p-pure. So by Lemma 5.3, [[∆∗ ⊢ e− : θ∗]]n(P ⊔n {p})h− = [[∆∗ ⊢ e− : θ∗]]nPh−.
But u− = [[∆∗ ⊢ e− : θ∗]]nPh−. Hence rel θ u u−.
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• Case check p for e:
Then Π∪{p} ⊆ P , hence p ∈ P . Now u = if p ∈ P then [[∆∗ ⊢ e : θ∗]]nPh else ⋆. Since p ∈ P ,
we have, u = [[∆∗ ⊢ e : θ∗]]nPh and, by the induction hypothesis on the typing derivation of e , we
have rel θ u [[∆∗ ⊢ e− : θ∗]]nPh−. Hence rel θ u u−.
7 Stack Semantics
This section gives a formal semantics using stack inspection, and shows that for standard expressions it
coincides with the eager semantics. The connection is much more direct than that of Wallach, Appel and
Felten, so a complete detailed proof is not very lengthy.
Because the operations on the stack are in fact stack-like, it is straightforward to give a denota-
tional style semantics parameterized on the stack. We define Stacks = nonempty list of(Principals×
P(Privileges)), taken as a cpo ordered by equality. The top is the head of the list, and we write infix ::
for cons, so 〈n,P〉 :: S is the stack with 〈n,P〉 on top of S , as in Section 2. We also use the predicate
chk defined there, and recall the definition p ∈ privs S ⇔ chk(p,S ).
Fact 7.1 For all S and all n we have privs(S )∩A (n) = privs(〈n,∅〉 :: S ).
Proof: The sets are equal because for any p
p ∈ privs(〈n,∅〉 :: S ) ⇔ chk(p,(〈n,∅〉 :: S )) by def privs
⇔ p ∈A (n)∧ chk(p,S ) by def chk and p 6∈∅
⇔ p ∈A (n)∧p ∈ privs(S ) by def privs
The stack semantics of an expression is a function
([D ⊢ e : t ]) ∈ Stacks→ ([D ])→ ([t ])⊥⋆
Just as in the eager semantics, we need to account for dynamic binding of privileges by interpreting arrow
types using an extra parameter. The stack semantics of types is as follows.
([bool]) = {true, false}
([t1 → t2]) = Stacks→ ([t1])→ ([t2])⊥⋆
The semantics of expressions is in Figure 4.
We can now relate the denotational semantics of Figure 2 to the stack semantics of Figure 4.
Theorem 7.2 (Consistency) For any standard expression e and stack (〈n,P ′〉 :: S ), we have
[[∅ ⊢ e : bool]]nP{} = ([∅ ⊢ e : bool])(〈n,P ′〉 :: S ){} where P = privs(〈n,P ′〉 :: S ).
Proof: Immediate consequence of Lemma 7.5 and definition sim bool below.
As in the proof of safety, we need to generalize the result to allow nonempty contexts. We also
consider expressions of arrow type, for which a logical relation is needed.
Definition 7.3 Define data-type indexed family sim t ⊆ [[t ]]⊥⋆× ([t ])⊥⋆ as follows. For any t , sim t d d ′
is true if d = d ′ and d ∈ {⊥,⋆}; it is false if d 6= d ′ and d or d ′ is in {⊥,⋆}. Otherwise:
sim bool b b ′ ⇔ b = b ′
sim (t1 → t2) f f
′ ⇔ ∀S ∈ Stacks.∀d ∈ [[t1]].∀d
′ ∈ ([t1]).
sim t1 d d
′ ⇒ sim t2 (f (privs S ) d) (f
′ S d ′)
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([D ⊢ true : bool])Sh = true
([D ⊢ x : t ])Sh = h.x
([D ⊢ if e then e1 else e2 : t ])Sh = let b = ([D ⊢ e : bool])Sh in
if b then ([D ⊢ e1 : t ])Sh else ([D ⊢ e2 : t ])Sh
([D ⊢ fun x . e : t1 → t2])Sh = λS ′ ∈ Stacks. λd ∈ ([t1]).
([D ,x : t1 ⊢ e : t2])S
′[h | x 7→d ]
([D ⊢ e1 e2 : t2])Sh = let f = ([D ⊢ e1 : t1 → t2])Sh in
let d = ([D ⊢ e2 : t1])Sh in fSd
([D ⊢ letrec f (x ) = e1 in e2 : t ])Sh
= let G(g) = λS ′. λd . ([D , f : t1 → t2,x : t1 ⊢ e1 : t2])S [h | f 7→g,x 7→d ] in
([D , f : t1 → t2 ⊢ e2 : t ])S [h | f 7→fix G]
([D ⊢ signs n ′ e : t ])Sh = ([D ⊢ e : t ])(〈n ′,∅〉 :: S )h
([D ⊢ dopriv p in e : t ])(〈n,P〉 :: S )h = ([D ⊢ e : t ])(〈n,P ∪{p}〉 :: S )h
([D ⊢ check p for e : t ])Sh = if chk(p,S ) then ([D ⊢ e : t ])Sh else ⋆
([D ⊢ test p then e1 else e2 : t ])Sh = if chk(p,S ) then ([D ⊢ e1 : t ])Sh else ([D ⊢ e2 : t ])Sh
Figure 4: Stack semantics
An environment h ∈ [[D ]] simulates an environment h ′ ∈ ([D ]), written sim D h h ′, provided
sim (D .x ) (h.x ) (h ′.x ) for all x ∈ dom(h).
Lemma 7.4 The relation sim preserves lubs. That is, for any t , if u : N→ [[t ]] and u ′ : N→ ([t ]) are
ascending chains and ∀i .sim t ui u ′i then sim t (
⊔
i ui ) (
⊔
i u
′
i
).
Proof: Go by structural induction on t . Assume that sim t ui u ′i . When t = bool, by definition sim we
obtain, for each i , ui = u ′i . Thus sim t (
⊔
i ui ) (
⊔
i u
′
i
).
When t = t1 → t2, consider any P ,S ,d ,d ′ with P = privs(S ) and sim t1 d d ′. We must show
sim t2 ((
⊔
i ui)Pd) ((
⊔
i u
′
i
)Sd ′), i.e., by definition of lubs we must show, sim t2
⊔
i (uiPd)
⊔
i(u
′
i
Sd ′).
By assumption, for every i , sim (t1 → t2) ui u ′i , hence, sim t2 (uiPd) (u ′iSd ′) holds for each i . Therefore,
by induction for t2, we obtain sim t2
⊔
i(uiPd)
⊔
i(u
′
i
Sd ′).
Lemma 7.5 For any stack (〈n,P ′〉 :: S ), for any standard expression e , and any D , t ,h,h ′, let u =
[[D ⊢ e : t ]]nPh where P = privs(〈n,P ′〉 ::S ), and let u ′=([D ⊢ e : t ])(〈n,P ′〉 ::S )h ′. Then simD h h ′⇒
sim t u u ′.
The Consistency Theorem follows from the lemma because sim∅ {} {} and since sim bool u u ′ implies
u = u ′.
Proof: of Lemma. Go by induction on e .
• Cases true and x : Immediate from semantic definitions.
• Case if e then e1 else e2: Directly by induction.
• Case fun x . e: Let u = [[D ⊢ fun x . e : t1 → t2]]nPh and let
u ′ = ([D ⊢ fun x . e : t1 → t2])Sh
′
Then u = λP ′. λd . [[D ,x : t1 ⊢ e : t2]]nP ′[h | x 7→d ]
u ′ = λS ′. λd ′. ([D ,x : t1 ⊢ e : t2])S ′[h ′ | x 7→d ′]
To show sim (t1 → t2) u u ′, need to show that for any S ′′,d ′′,d ′′′, such that sim t1 d ′′ d ′′′, it is the
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case that sim t2 (u (privs S ′′) d ′′) (u ′ S ′′ d ′′′). By standardness, e is signs n ′ e ′ for some n ′,e ′.
Thus we can proceed as follows, using e ≡ signs n ′ e ′ and semantics of signs.
u (privs S ′′) d ′′ = [[D ,x : t1 ⊢ e : t2]]n (privs S
′′) [h | x 7→d ′′]
= [[D ,x : t1 ⊢ e
′ : t2]]n
′ (privs(S ′′)∩A (n ′)) [h | x 7→d ′′]
u ′ S ′′ d ′′′ = ([D ,x : t1 ⊢ e : t2]) S
′′ [h ′ | x 7→d ′′′]
= ([D ,x : t1 ⊢ e
′ : t2])(〈n
′
,∅〉 :: S ′′) [h ′ | x 7→d ′′′]
Note that by definition sim and by assumption sim t1 d ′′ d ′′′, we have, sim (D ,x : t1) [h | x 7→
d ′′] [h ′ | x 7→d ′′′]. Furthermore, by Fact 7.1, privs(S ′′)∩A (n ′) = privs(〈n ′,∅〉 :: S ′′). Therefore,
by induction for e ′, we obtain, sim t2 (u (privs S ′′) d ′′) (u ′ S ′′ d ′′′). This is where we need
Definition 2.1.
• Case e1e2: [[D ⊢ e1 e2 : t2]]nPh = let f = [[D ⊢ e1 : t1 → t2]]nPh in
let d = [[D ⊢ e2 : t1]]nPh in fPd
([D ⊢ e1 e2 : t2])Sh
′ = let f ′ = ([D ⊢ e1 : t1 → t2])Sh ′ in
let d ′ = ([D ⊢ e2 : t1])Sh in f ′Sd ′
Need to show sim t2 (fPd) (f ′Sd ′). Since sim D h h ′ and P = privs(S ), therefore, by induction
for e1, we have sim (t1 → t2) f f ′. Similarly, by induction for e2, we have sim t1 d d ′. Hence the
result follows by definition sim since P = privs(S ). This case of the proof shows the necessity of
defining the relation sim.
• Case letrec f (x ) = e1 in e2:
[[D ⊢ letrec f (x ) = e1 in e2 : t ]]nPh
= let G(g) = λP ′. λd . [[D , f : t1 → t2,x : t1 ⊢ e1 : t2]]nP ′[h | f 7→g ,x 7→d ] in
[[D , f : t1 → t2 ⊢ e2 : t ]]nP [h | f 7→fix G ]
([D ⊢ letrec f (x ) = e1 in e2 : t ])Sh
= let G ′(g ′) = λS ′. λd ′. ([D , f : t1 → t2,x : t1 ⊢ e1 : t2])S ′[h ′ | f 7→g ′,x 7→d ′] in
([D , f : t1 → t2 ⊢ e2 : t ])S [h
′ | f 7→fix G ′]
To show the result, it suffices to show sim (t1 → t2) (fix G) (fix G ′), because then we can use
induction for e2, noting that sim (D , f : t1 → t2) [h | f 7→ fix G ] [h ′ | f 7→ fix G ′], and that P =
privs(S ). Accordingly, we demonstrate the following claim:
∀i .sim (t1 → t2) gi g
′
i
(7)
Then from Lemma 7.4, we get sim (t1 → t2)
⊔
i gi
⊔
i g
′
i
. This completes the proof. To show (7),
we proceed by induction on i . We have:
g0 = λP ′. λd .⊥
gi+1 = λP ′. λd . [[D , f : t1 → t2,x : t1 ⊢ e1 : t2]]nP ′[h | f 7→gi ,x 7→d ]
= {because e1 ≡ signs n ′ e ′1 by standardness}
λP ′. λd . [[D , f : t1 → t2,x : t1 ⊢ e1 : t2]]n ′(P ′∩A (n ′))[h | f 7→gi ,x 7→d ]
g ′0 = λS ′. λd ′.⊥
g ′i+1 = λS ′. λd ′. ([D , f : t1 → t2,x : t1 ⊢ e1 : t2])S ′[h ′ | f 7→g ′i ,x 7→d ′]
= {because e1 ≡ signs n ′ e ′1}
λS ′. λd ′. ([D , f : t1 → t2,x : t1 ⊢ e ′1 : t2])(〈n ′,∅〉 :: S ′)[h ′ | f 7→g ′i ,x 7→d ′]
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Clearly, sim (t1 → t2) g0 g ′0, by definition sim. To show sim (t1 → t2) gi+1 g ′i+1, assume sim (t1 →
t2) gi g
′
i
(induction hypothesis), and that for any S ′ and P ′ = privs(S ′), sim t1 d d ′ holds. Then
sim (D , f : t1 → t2,x : t1) [h | f 7→gi ,x 7→d ] [h
′ | f 7→g ′i ,x 7→d
′]
by definition sim and since sim D h h ′. Now by Fact 7.1, P ′∩A (n ′) = privs(〈n ′,∅〉 :: S ′), so by
the main induction hypothesis on e ′1, sim t2 (gi+1P ′d) (g ′i+1S ′d ′) holds.
• Case signs n e: We have: [[D ⊢ signs n ′ e : t ]]nPh = [[D ⊢ e : t ]]n ′(P ∩ A (n ′))h and
([D ⊢ signs n ′ e : t ])Sh ′ = ([D ⊢ e : t ])(〈n ′,∅〉 :: S )h ′ so the result holds by induction on e pro-
vided P ′∩A (n ′) = privs(〈n ′,∅〉 :: S ). But this equality holds by Fact 7.1.
• Case dopriv p in e: The result holds by induction for e , provided that P ⊔n {p}= privs(〈n,P ′∪
{p}〉 :: S ). This holds because for any p ′
p ′ ∈ P ⊔n {p}
⇔ p ′ ∈ P ∨ (p ′ ∈A (n)∧p ′ = p) by def ⊔n
⇔ chk(p ′,〈n,P ′〉 :: S )∨ (p ′ ∈A (n)∧p ′ = p) assumption, def privs
⇔ (p ′ ∈A (n)∧ (p ′ ∈ P ′∨ chk(p ′,S ))∨ (p ′ ∈A (n)∧p ′ = p) def chk
⇔ p ′ ∈A (n)∧ (p ′ ∈ P ′∪{p}∨ chk(p ′,S )) logic and sets
⇔ p ′ ∈ privs(〈n,P ′∪{p}〉 :: S ) defs chk and privs
• Case check p for e: Both semantics are conditional; the condition in one case is p ∈ P ′ and in
the other case chk(p,S ), and these are equivalent conditions by assumption P ′ = privs(S ) for the
Lemma. In case the condition is true, the result holds by induction, which applies because for both
semantics the security arguments for e are unchanged. If the condition is false, the result holds
because both semantics are ⋆ and sim t ⋆ ⋆.
• Case test p then e1 else e2: Similar to the case for check.
8 Conclusion
Our work was motivated by the hope, inspired by discussions with Dave Schmidt, for more principled
semantics of static analyses presented in the form of type and effect systems. Our work serves to demon-
strate two attractive features of denotational semantics, which a decade ago seemed largely eclipsed by
operational semantics. The first is proof of program equalities via equational reasoning on denotations.
The second is logical relations, defined by structural recursion on types. We are glad for the opportunity
to demonstrate the utility of denotational semantics while celebrating the contributions of Dave Schmidt,
so adept a practitioner of all forms of semantic modeling.
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